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REAF'FlRMING RELATIONSIIlP-SPECIFIC 
INVESTMENTS 
Comments on Miwa and Ramseyer's 
'Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments' 
Scott E. Masten* 
I, too, have a work-related anecdote from my youth to relate. During 
one summer break from college, I had a job on the night shift in the can­
ning plant of a Coca-Cola bottling franchisee in my hometown in New 
Hampshire. The process of canning tonic (known as "soda" outside of 
New England) consisted of three stages, beginning with the fabrication of 
cans in a room at one end of the building and concluding with the filling 
and sealing operations in a room at the other end. In between, workers in 
a third room inspected cans as they arrived by conveyor from the fabrica­
tion facility, loaded empty cans onto pallets for storage, and unloaded cans 
of the appropriate type (Coke, Tab, and Shasta) back onto the conveyor to 
assure a continuous supply of containers to the filling room "down­
stream." 
The year was 1976 and Oliver Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies, 
published just the year before, had not yet found its way into the under­
graduate cu"iculum. Nevertheless, I recall finding it curious at the time to 
learn that the can fabrication operation in the adjoining room was a sepa­
rate company from the bottling franchise that stored, filled, and, ulti­
mately, distributed the cans. 
If youthful experience colors one's perceptions, it would seem that 
I, rather than Professors Miwa and Ramseyer, should be the one ex­
pressing skepticism about the importance of relationship-specific in­
vestments in organization decisions. Whereas the separate ownership 
of can fabrication and filling operations, despite the location specific­
ity of the facilities, at least appears to conflict with the relationship­
specific investment hypothesis, the circuit factory in which one of them 
once worked exhibited neither specific investments nor special gov­
ernance arrangements - exactly as the theory predicts! What's more, 
as I will argue below, the same can be said of virtually all of their evi­
dence. 
To be fair, Miwa and Ramseyer neither intend nor claim to refute 
the relationship-specific investment hypothesis. On the contrary, they 
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say the theory makes sense.1 And the evidence - their "empirical 
vacuum" derogation notwithstanding - does, by their own account, 
provide "substantial evidence of the relation between RSis and 
governance."2 The problem, as Miwa and Ramseyer see it, is that set­
tings in which investments are large and specific enough to affect the 
choice of governance arrangements are so few and anomalous as to 
render the theory irrelevant for understanding the organization of 
everyday industries. Modern manufacturing simply entails far fewer 
relationship-specific investments than transaction-cost economists 
would have us believe. And where such investments do arise, reputa­
tion and standard market contracting adequately deal with the associ­
ated problems. As a logician might put it, the theory, though valid, 
lacks existential import. 
Miwa and Ramseyer are not the first, nor even the most promi­
nent, scholars to express reservations about the theory's domain. In­
deed, no less an authority on the transaction-cost determinants of or­
ganizational form than Ronald Coase has questioned the importance 
of specific investments on repeated occasions - most recently, in his 
extensive critique of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian's analysis of Gen­
eral Motors' 1926 acquisition of Fisher Body.3 From his observations 
of the U.S. automotive industry in the 1930s, Coase saw that "suppli­
ers were often unwilling to sell too great a proportion of their output 
to one customer"4 for fear that that customer might take advantage of 
its position "to drive down the price to a level which yields no return 
on such investments."5 Further inquiry, however, led him "to doubt 
not the reality of this risk, but its importance"6: "Even though the 
costs of contracting [may] increase more than the costs of vertical in­
tegration as assets become more specific and quasi rents increase, ver­
tical integration will not displace the long-term contract unless the 
co,sts of contracting become greater than the costs of vertical integra­
tion . . . .  "7 And that, Coase adds incisively, "might never happen for 
1. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: 
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2636, 2637 {2000). 
2 Id. 
3. See R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 
15 (2000) [hereinafter Coase, Fisher Body] (criticizing Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Inte­
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 
{1978)). 
4. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 3, 44 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm]. 
5. Id.at42. 
6. Id.at44. 
7. Id. at43. 
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any value of quasi rents actually found."8 The reason is that "the pro­
pensity for opportunistic behavior is usually effectively checked by the 
need to take account of the effect of the firm's actions on future busi­
ness" and by "contractual arrangements."9 
The importance of relationship-specific investments to organiza­
tion is ultimately an empirical question and, as such, Miwa and 
Ramseyer's claims require an empirical response.10 Good empirical 
research is always rooted in theory, however. So before turning to the 
evidence, some consideration of the underpinnings of the relationship­
specific investment hypothesis is in order. 
I. THE THEORY 
Miwa and Ramseyer summarize the relationship-specific invest­
ment hypothesis as follows: "According to this intuition, the scope 
and size of RSis can directly affect the governance arrangements firms 
choose. Whether business partners negotiate long-term contracts, 
spot contracts, equity investments, franchise arrangements, or even 
mergers can depend vitally on the RSis at stake."11 
Though perhaps intentionally hyperbolic, this characterization 
nevertheless overstates the role that specific investments play in the 
theory. To be sure, relationship-specific investments have been 
prominent, arguably even central, in the "operationalization" of 
transaction-cost reasoning. But the effect of specific investments on 
organizational form in the theory is neither direct, exclusive, nor 
decisive. First, contrary to Miwa and Ramseyer's portrayal of the 
relationship-specific investment hypothesis as predicting the adoption 
8. Id. Coase actually goes one step further, declaring: "In any case, I am very doubtful 
whether there is such a systematic relationship [between specific investments and costs of 
contracting relative to vertical integration] as that described." Id. 
9. Id. at 44. Remarkably, Coase documents that he formed his views of the importance 
of relationship-specific investments very early on. The following are excerpts from corre­
spondence from Coase to Ronald Fowler in 1932: 
Suppose the production of a particular product requires a large capital equipment which is, 
however, specialized insofar that it can only be used for the particular product concerned or 
can only be readapted at great cost Then the firm producing such a product for one con­
sumer finds itself faced with one great risk - that the consumer may transfer his demand 
elsewhere or that he may exercise his monopoly power to force down the price • • • •  
Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 4, at 43 (letter dated March 24, 1932). 
My queries about the form of contracts for products requiring large capital equipment has 
shown me that contractual arrangements can be made to avoid this risk. Thus, the consum­
ing firm may buy the particular equipment itself even though it is in another company's 
plant. There are a number of other contractual devices which tend to get over this difficulty. 
Id. at 45 (letter dated May 7, 1932). 
10. I leave it to Klein to respond to Coase's critique, which he does in Benjamin Klein, 
Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000). 
11. Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2638 (emphasis added). 
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of "extra-contractual governance arrangements," transaction-cost 
economists have always regarded contracts and other organizational 
arrangements as alternative responses to the appropriability hazards 
engendered by specific investments.12 Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 
for example, expressly identify vertical integration and contracting as 
substitute devices for curbing opportunism: "The primary alternative 
to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of oppor­
tunistic behavior is some form of economically enforceable long-term 
contract. ... The relevant question then becomes when will vertical 
integration be observed as a solution and when will the use of the 
market-contracting process occur."13 The existence of relationship­
specific assets, by itself, implies only the desirability of adopting some 
protective governance arrangement but says nothing about which such 
arrangement will be chosen;14 determining whether contracts, vertical 
integration, franchising, rate-of-return regulation, or yet some other 
organizational structure represents the best (least costly) solution re­
quires incorporation of other considerations into the analysis. 
And in fact, asset specificity is just one of a variety of factors the 
theory identifies as affecting the relative efficiency of alternative gov­
ernance arrangements. Among the more prominent, especially in re­
lation to contracting, are reputation15 and the complexity of and uncer­
tainty associated with the transaction.16 Indeed, complexity and 
uncertainty have been at least as important as asset specificity in the 
development of Williamson's framework. 17 Even in Williamson's 
12. Miwa and Ramseyer subtly shift terminology from choosing among "governance 
arrangements," see, e.g., Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2637, to choosing among "extra­
contractual governance arrangements," see, e.g., id. at 2643, 2644. They also vacillate in 
qualifying the prediction with a reference to inlpediments to contracting. 
13. Klein et al., supra note 3, at 302. Cf. Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Struc­
ture of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 105 (1988) 
("Other things equal, we expect the parties more frequently to choose vertical integration or 
a long-term contract as the quasi-rents associated with specific investments become more 
inlportant and the associated benefits of precommitment increase." (emphasis added)). 
14. See generally Klein et al., supra note 3; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND 
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES]; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Eco­
nomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. 
15. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 3, at 304. 
16. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 14, at 21-24; 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 14, at 56-60. 
17. For example, Williamson's discussion of inlpediments to contracting posed by com­
plexity and uncertainty take precedence over his discussion of idiosyncratic investments in 
MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 14, at 8-10, 20-30. For Williamson's earlier for­
mulation of the theory, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: 
Market Failure Considerations, AM. ECON. REV., May 1971 (Papers and Proceedings of the 
Eighty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association), 112, especially the 
2672 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:2668 
more recent writings, where relationship-specific investment has 
played a more prominent role, maladaptation problems arise only in 
the presence of uncertainty and complexity. Thus, Williamson de­
scribes adaptation as the central problem of organization18 and 
"[t]ransactions conducted under certainty [as] relatively uninterest­
ing. "19 Similarly, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian ascribe the choice beM 
tween contracting and integration to the complexity of the transaction: 
"As we shall see, the costs of contractually specifying all important 
elements of quality varies considerably by type of asset. For some asM 
sets it may be essentially impossible to effectively specify all elements 
of quality and therefore vertical integration is more likely. "20 
All of this has two implications. First, as always where human beM 
havior is subject to influences from multiple sources, predicting the ef M 
feet of one determinant on the choice of governance form requires 
that other determinants be held constant. Second, because we can 
never control for all of the factors that affect such decisions, our theoM 
ries can only yield probabilistic, never deterministic, predictions. The 
theory does not say, as Miwa and Ramseyer would have it, that trans­
actors will adopt extra-contractual governance arrangements when 
production involves large relationship-specific investments, only that, 
holding other things (complexity, uncertainty, reputation, and so on) 
constant, the likelihood that SOl,lle specialized governance arrangeM 
ment will be adopted increases. Whether that arrangement will be a 
contract or vertical integration or another arrangement depends on 
the effectiveness of those alternatives in the prevailing circumstances.21 
subsection entitled "Contractual Incompleteness," at 115-17, in which he states that "only 
when the need to make unprogrammed adaptations is introduced does the market versus 
internal organization issue become engaging," id. at 113. 
18. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 277-79 (1991). 
19. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 14, at 253. Much of the em­
pirical literature also explicitly treats vertical integration as the result of a combination of 
specific investments and complexity/uncertainty. See, e.g., Scott E. Masten, The Organiza­
tion of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1984); Erin 
Anderson & David C. Schmittlein, Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examina­
tion, 15 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1984); Erin Anderson, Transaction Costs as Determinants of 
Opportunism in Integrated and Independent Sales Forces, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 247 
(1988); Bruce R. Lyons, Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction 
Cost Theory, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 257 (1994). 
20. Klein et al., supra note 3, at 301. Later in the article, Klein et al. contrast the prob­
lems of contracting for land and employment services: "The primary reason [why land­
rental contracts rather than vertical integration can often be used to attenuate opportunistic 
behavior in agricultural contracts] is because it is rather cheap to specify and monitor the 
relevant contract terms (the quality of the good being purchased) and to enforce this par­
ticular rental contract." Id. at 320. They contrast this with employment contracts "where it 
is essentially impossible to effectively specify and enforce quality elements (for example, all 
working conditions and the effort expended by workers) . . . •  " Id. 
21. Holding complexity and uncertainty c�nstant (at some nontrivial level), an increase 
in the level of asset specificity may increase the probability of integration if, for example, 
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II. THE EVIDENCE 
A. Japanese Automotive Subcontracting 
Like Cease, Miwa and Ramseyer arrive at their conclusion from 
observations of the automotive industry, albeit half a continent, an 
ocean, and more than half a century distant in space and time. In the 
Japanese automotive supply industry, they inform us, (i) second- and 
third-tier suppliers, like their erstwhile circuit-producing employer, 
make few large investments of any type and, a fortiori, few large in­
vestments specific to a particular customer, and (ii) the investments of 
first-tier suppliers, though sometimes large, are at most only model­
rather than firm- (relationship-) specific and, with model changes oc­
curring every three or four years, are short-lived.22 
Their account of the industry, they readily admit, is impressionistic: 
They have no direct measures of specific investments to support their 
conclusion of the absence of "widespread, substantial physical-asset or 
human-capital RSis."23 More fundamentally, however, Miwa and 
Ramseyer's judgment that the industry lacks large specific investments 
begs the question of what large is. Even if Miwa and Ramseyer were 
able to provide a precise monetary value for the specific investments 
in the industry, against what metric could we judge whether or not 
those values are large? U.S. auto companies spend millions of dollars 
on model-specific tooling and other investments. How are we to com­
pare these to the value of investments specific to the production of 
particular components going into the manufacture of jet engines or 
missiles or the installation of cable television systems? How does the 
three- to four-year product cycle of automobiles compare with the du­
rability of a sales representative's investment in knowledge of a manu­
facturer's product? 
As the discussion of the preceding section indicates, how large and 
durable specific investments must be to affect the choice of govern­
ance in any particular circumstance is something that the theory does 
not - and cannot - answer. In principle, even very small levels of 
quasi-rents could be enough to motivate the adoption of protective 
governance arrangements if those arrangements are low cost. Again, 
all the theory tells us is that, in any given setting, the probability that 
the hazards of simple bargains will exceed the costs of alternative gov­
ernance arrangements increases as the level of specific investments 
(and associated quasi-rents) increases. 
increased specificity motivates longer-term, and therefore more costly, contracts (relative to 
integration). But this effect is indirect in that it works through changes in contracting be­
havior. 
22. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2653- 54. 
23. Id. at 2637. 
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From this perspective, Miwa and Ramseyer's discursive account of 
the industry appears to line up pretty well with the relationship­
specific investment hypothesis: Small, higher-tier suppliers in the in­
dustry use fairly standard assets to produce (to order) relatively simple 
components but, at the same time, also do not enjoy the protections of 
long-term contracts or other specialized governance structures. First­
tier and larger, second-tier suppliers, by contrast, (i) make larger in­
vestments, some of which are specific to a particular customer's prod­
uct, and (ii) are, correspondingly, the ones more likely to employ 
cross-equity holdings and other safeguards.24 The largest specific in­
vestments, if the theory is correct, would not be found among suppli­
ers at all but within the automobile manufacturers themselves. The 
organizational puzzle of the Japanese automotive industry - if indeed 
there is one - is how manufacturers and suppliers managed to get by 
for so long using relatively short-term, nondetailed contracts despite 
the sizeable model-specific investments involved.25 
B. Statistical Analysis 
Though Miwa and Ramseyer regard their discursive account as 
providing the most compelling evidence, they nevertheless supplement 
their impressionistic evidence with a more formal statistical analysis. 
Like others who have conducted empirical studies in this area, Miwa 
and Ramseyer do not have direct measures of the explanatory vari­
ables of interest and must settle for proxies. Although the quality of 
the proxies will affect our confidence in the results, this alone is not a 
reason to forgo the analysis. 
The organizational arrangement they wish to explain is the holding 
by assemblers of equity investments in their suppliers. Although they 
include a variety of control variables in their estimations, the two vari­
ables of particular interest are (i) the percent of a supplier's output 
going to a given assembler and (ii) whether the supplier is a member 
of one (and only one) assembler's supplier association. Of these two, 
only the first, the assembler's share of the supplier's output, is consis­
tently statistically significant, indicating that an assembler is more 
likely to have significant equity holdings in a supplier for whom it is a 
major customer. 
To many, this may seem like pretty strong support for the 
relationship-specific hypothesis; in plain English, the results say that 
24. Miwa and Ramseyer's distinction between model-specific and relationship-specific 
investments is irrelevant; all that matters is the difference between the value of the asset in 
its first-best use (supplier B producing model X for customer A) and its value if the transac­
tion between A and B does not take place. 
25. See Klein, supra note 10, at 127 (attributing this success to reputational considera­
tions). 
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the more dependent is a supplier on a particular customer for its sales, 
the more likely the transactors are to engage in cross-equity holdings. 
Miwa and Ramseyer, however, deploy a rather elaborate argument to 
suggest that membership in a single supplier association (LoneClub) is 
a better measure of specific investments than a supplier's dependence 
on its principle customer and that the insignificance of the former 
shows that specific investments are not important. 
The argument itself is problematic but, even if it were valid, rea­
sons exist for not placing too much emphasis on the LoneClub results. 
First, whether to belong to a supplier association and, if so, to how 
many, are themselves decision variables. As a statistical matter, re­
sults of standard regressions containing endogenous variables as 
"right-hand-side" explanatory variables have no meaningful interpre­
tation. The point can be illustrated with a simple example: Suppose, 
as some have argued, that belonging to a supplier association is itself a 
means of protecting against hold up and that supplier association 
membership and equity investments are alternative (substitute) ways 
of securing that protection.26 By reducing the risk of appropriation, 
association membership could thus very well decrease the need for 
equity investments, resulting in a negative correlation between asso­
ciation membership and cross-equity holdings. The point is that, 
without a more fully specified model of association membership and 
its interactions with equity holdings, we can infer very little from these 
results. Also troubling is the fact that Miwa and Ramseyer's regres­
sions show no significant difference between belonging to no associa­
tion, one association, or multiple associations. If membership in an as­
sociation is a mere formality, or if the associations themselves are 
"trivial social clubs"27 with no effect on firm behavior, this variable be­
comes a very thin foundation indeed on which to reject the theory. 
C. The Broader Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature examining the determinants of organiza­
tional form and contract design is extensive, certainly far too large to 
review here. Suffice it to say, surveys of the literature have all come to 
virtually the same conclusion, namely, that transaction-cost economics 
has been profoundly successful empirically.28 The industries analyzed 
26. Miwa and Ramseyer, for example, describe Gilson and Roe as arguing that cross­
shareholdings and membership in business groups help to address the problem of appropri­
ability. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2644. 
27. Id. at 2661. 
28. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335 (1995); Keith J. 
Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from 
Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation, 9 J. REG. ECON. 5 (1996); Bruce 
R. Lyons, Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: Inter-Firm Contracts, OXFORD 
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include such seemingly quotidian settings as ocean shipping, 29 over­
land trucking, 30 marketing and distribution, 31 engineering subcon­
tracting, 32 and even automotive supply, 33 not to mention more exotic 
industries like petroleum coke refining. 34 Some even use measures 
similar to Miwa and Ramseyer to reflect the specificity of investments; 
Lyons, for example, regards the share of output taken by a firm's most 
important customer as a measure of the firm's vulnerability to hold 
up. 35 Asset specificity is not the only variable shown to affect govern­
ance form in these studies, nor are specific investments the critical 
variable in every setting. But as Michael Whinston wrote recently, the 
prediction that an "increase in quasi-rents will increase the likelihood 
of vertical integration . . .  is so far consistent with nearly all of the ex­
isting empirical literature. " 36 
REv. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 27; Regis Coeurderoy & Bertrand Quelin, L'economie 
des coats de transaction: un bi/an des etudes empiriques sur l'integration verticale [Transac­
tion-Cost Theory: A Survey on Empirical Studies on Vertical Integration], 107 REV. 
D'ECONOMIE POLmQUE 145 (1997); Scott E. Masten & Stephane Saussier, Econometrics of 
Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting, 92 
REV. D'ECONOMIE lNDUSTRIELLE 215 (2000). 
2 9. See, e.g., Stephen Craig Pirrong, Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A 
Transactions Cost Explanation, 36 J.L. & ECON. 937 (1993). 
30. See, e.g., THOMAS N. HUBBARD, How WIDE IS THE SCOPE OF HOLD-UP-BASED 
THEORIES? CONTRACTUAL FORM AND MARKET THICKNESS IN TRUCKING (Nat'! Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7347, 1999); JACK A. NICKERSON & BRIAN S. 
SILVERMAN, WHY AREN'T ALL TRUCK DRIVERS OWNER-OPERATORS? ASSET OWNER­
SHIP AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN INTERSTATE FOR-HIRE TRUCKING (Har­
vard Business School, Working Paper No. 00-01, 1999). 
31. See, e.g., Anderson & Schmittlein, supra note 19; Anderson, supra note 19; Erin An­
derson & Anne T. Coughlan, International Market Entry and Expansion via Independent or 
Integrated Channels of Distribution, 51 J. MARKETING 71 (1987); George John & Barton A. 
Weitz, Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analy­
sis, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337 (1988); Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of Dependence 
Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels, 52 J. 
MARKETING 20 (1988). 
32 See, e.g., Bruce R. Lyons, Contract and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of 
Transaction Cost Theory, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 257 (1994). 
33. See, e.g., Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical 
Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982); Kirk Monteverde & 
David J. Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration, 25 J.L. & ECON. 321 
(1982); Scott E. Masten et al., Vertical Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the 
Influence of Transaction Specific Assets, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (1989), 
34. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in 
Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987). 
35. Lyons, supra note 32. 
36. Michael D. Whinston, On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integra­
tion, at 2 (Feb. 9, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Like the proverbial economist who searches for his car keys under 
the streetlight rather than in the alley where he lost them because "the 
light is so much better there," Miwa and Ramseyer go looking for ex­
amples of large relationship-specific investments where the theory 
says they should be least likely to find them: in the facilities of suppli­
ers rather than in the auto companies themselves. Not finding them 
there, they conclude that they don't exist and take the bus home. 
Miwa and Ramseyer's skepticism of the role played by 
relationship-specific investments in the organization of the Japanese 
automotive industry is undoubtedly genuine and may even be justi­
fied. Although the evidence they present does not support their case, 
additional research may yet prove them right. 
At a broader level, skepticism toward specific investment-based 
explanations is a healthy attitude. The empirical successes of the the­
ory so far combined with the fact that virtually every transaction in­
volves some level of irreversible and unrecoverable investment - if 
only to cross the street or search out another web page - make it 
temptingly easy to ascribe any and all observed organizational ar­
rangements to specific investments. Econotribologists37 need to be on 
guard that specific investments do not become the handy but empty 
catchall explanation that, in succession, transaction costs, risk aver­
sion, and asymmetric information have been. Progress on the road to 
understanding the causes and consequences of organization requires, 
as Oliver Williamson is fond of pointing out, "modest, slow, molecu­
lar, definitive work."38 
37. Econotribology, n., the study of economic frictions: transaction-cost economics. 
[neologism from ECONO(MICS) + TRIBOLOGY, the science of the mechanisms of friction.] 
38. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 13 (1996 ). 
